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Abstract
Background: Historically, primary medical care in the UK has been delivered by general practitioners who are
independent contractors, operating under a contract, which until 2004 was subject to little performance
management. In keeping with the wider political impetus to introduce markets and competition into the NHS,
reforms were introduced to allow new providers to bid for contracts to provide primary care services in England.
These contracts known as ‘Alternative Provider Medical Services’, were encouraged by two centrally-driven rounds
of procurement (2007/8 and 2008/9). This research investigated the commissioning and operation of such
Alternative Providers of Primary Care (APPCs).
Methods: Two qualitative case studies were undertaken in purposively sampled English Primary Care Trusts (PCTs)
and their associated APPCs over 14 months (2009-10). We observed 65 hours of meetings, conducted 23 interviews
with PCT and practice staff, and gathered relevant associated documentation.
Results and conclusions: We found that the procurement and contracting process was costly and time-
consuming. Extensive local consultation was undertaken, and there was considerable opposition in some areas.
Many APPCs struggled to build up their patient list sizes, whilst over-performing on walk-in contracts. Contracting
for APPCs was ‘transactional’, in marked contrast to the ‘relational’ contracting usually found in the NHS, with
APPCs subject to tight performance management. These complicated and costly processes contrast to those
experienced by traditionally owned GP partnerships. However, managers reported that the perception of
competition had led existing practices to improve their services.
The Coalition Government elected in 2010 is committed to ‘Any Qualified Provider’ of secondary care, and some
commentators argue that this should also be applied to primary care. Our research suggests that, if this is to
happen, a debate is needed about the operation of a market in primary care provision, including the trade-offs
between transparent processes, fair procurement, performance assurance and cost.
Background
Since 1948, National Health Service (NHS) Primary
Medical Services in England have been provided by
General Practitioners (GPs), via the General Medical
Services (GMS) contract. This contract is centrally nego-
tiated and flexible in its operation, with little specifica-
tion of the details of services to be provided. Primary
medical services (PMS) contractors are required to
provide patients with essential services, which are
loosely defined, and most also provide a menu of addi-
tional and enhanced services which are paid for in addi-
tion to the core contract. GP practices act as both the
gateway to and co-ordinator of patient access through-
out their care journey. They are usually the first point of
contact for a patient seeking treatment or advice about
their health, and most work together in practices owned
by one or more self-employed GPs and which employ
additional clinical staff such as nurses and healthcare
assistants. Payment for the contract is worked out from
a formula based on the practice population profile,
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taking into account factors such as age and gender of
patients and list turnover (number of registered
patients) of each practice, rather than the number of
doctors.
A series of reforms in the NHS since 1991 have
encouraged market-like behaviour to develop, splitting
purchasers (commissioners) and providers of health ser-
vices [1]. As part of these reforms, Alternative Provider
Medical Services (APMS) contracts were introduced in
2004, permitting primary care to be commissioned from
organisations other than traditional general medical
practices (though the new form of contract may also be
held by the latter). The initial logic underlying this
move was to enhance the provision of services for
groups underserved by traditional general practices,
such as the homeless [2]. APMS contracts differed from
the centrally-negotiated GMS contracts in that Primary
Care Trusts (PCTs) were able to negotiate the exact
terms of the contract locally.
Initially, few APMS practices were procured, but in
2007 the Government acted to stimulate entry of new
providers into the primary care market by introducing
the ‘Fairness in Primary Care Procurement’ (FPCP) pro-
cess into PCT areas deemed to be ‘under-doctored’.
This was followed in 2008 by the ‘Equitable Access to
Primary Medical Care’ (EAPMC) initiative. Ten PCTs
participated in FPCP, with most of these procuring a
single new practice [3]. Under EAPMC, 112 new prac-
tices in 50 PCTs were procured. Successful bidders for
these contracts included private companies, social enter-
prises and other mutual organisations, groups of existing
GPs, and organisations integrating with other NHS pro-
viders such as Foundation Trusts and providers of out-
of-hours care. Under these two rounds of procurement,
a standard APMS contract template was developed by
the Department of Health, although elements of this
could still be subject to local negotiation [4].
Officially, FPCP was developed to deliver the commit-
ment in the 2006 White Paper Our Health, Our Care, Our
Say [2] to tackle inequalities in access to primary medical
care services in the most under-doctored PCTs through-
out England. This round of procurement was expected to
provide patients with greater access and choice, including
flexible opening hours, extended services and easier access
to primary medical care services in their local area [5].
EAPMC arose from the interim report of the NHS Next
Stage Review (NSR) [6], committing the NHS to establish
at least 150 ‘GP-led Health Centres’ (one in each PCT
area) which would provide access to GP services, including
walk-in services and pre-bookable GP appointments, from
8am to 8pm, seven days a week. The NSR also stated that,
in addition to the above, the NHS would establish at least
100 new GP practices in the 25 percent of the country
with the poorest primary care provision.
This paper reports a qualitative study of the commis-
sioning and subsequent monitoring of primary care
from organisations other than traditional general medi-
cal practices in two English locations. We have termed
these types of organisations ‘Alternative Providers of
Primary Care’ (APPC).
Following an outline of our methods, we report the
findings of the study. We conclude with a brief discus-
sion of the significance of our findings in the context of
developing policy [7,8].
Methods
This research had two main objectives: first to under-
stand how PCTs commission primary care, including: the
process of commissioning; the specification of care to be
provided and the performance management of subse-
quent contracts. Secondly, to understand how APPCs are
organised and operated for the provision of primary med-
ical care to the NHS, including: marketing and the
impact of competition; internal organisation, including
skill-mix, the organisation of work and the specification
of tasks; external relationships, including identifiable
impacts on surrounding practices and interactions with
local professional groups such as the Local Medical Com-
mittee and local commissioning groups.
In order to address these issues we undertook two paral-
lel case studies over a period of approximately 14 months
ending in December 2010 [9]. Each case comprised a geo-
graphically-defined cluster of a single PCT (or multiple
PCTs sharing commissioning functions) and some or all
of its associated APPCs. The sites were purposively
selected to provide a range of APPCs (including ownership
types, date of procurement and size) and locations within
two discrete Strategic Health Authority (geographical)
areas. Data collection methods were wholly qualitative and
placed considerable emphasis on observation of meetings
(such as internal APPC meetings and those held between
APPCs and their associated PCT) in addition to one-to-
one interviews and collection of available documentation.
Observations were recorded by the observer in contem-
poraneous field notes, and interviews were audio-recorded
and transcribed with permission. In total we observed 27
meetings and conducted 23 formal interviews (each lasting
about an hour) with individuals from PCTs and APPCs
(management, GPs and practice managers) who were
involved with the procurement, operation of and monitor-
ing of contracts. Interviewees were identified via job titles
(e.g. commissioning manager, GP manager), from observa-
tions of roles and behaviour in meetings and following
recommendations from other interviewees. This allowed
us to gather as wide a range of views as possible. We also
undertook informal discussions with PCT representatives
at the beginning of the research to gain contextual detail
and an understanding of the ‘story so far’. These are
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reported as meetings between the researcher and PCT
staff. In addition we collected documents such as tender
documents and business plans (for each APPC), discussion
documents, performance reports and meeting minutes
relating to APPCs. These were used to provide back-
ground and contextual information about the procure-
ment process, contract monitoring and APPC priorities
and performance. A summary of the data collected can be
found in Table 1.
In Site 1 we observed 11 pre-meetings (average
2.5hrs), 9 Joint service reviews (average 2.5 hours), and
2 others (average 2.5hrs). These included more informal
discussions pre and post meetings with APPC and PCT
representatives resulting in approx 55 hours of observa-
tion. In Site 2 we observed 5 meetings (average 2 hrs)
resulting in approx 10 hours of observation. The imbal-
ance in data collection is due to the differences in orga-
nisation between the two sites. In Site 1, many meetings
were held (including, for example, ‘pre-meetings’ held
before the formal joint service review meetings), and a
significant number of PCT and other staff were
involved. In Site 2, far fewer meetings were held, and
the process was managed by a smaller team of people.
In spite of this, the overall findings were similar between
the sites, As a result of these differences, more illustra-
tive quotes are provided from Site 1.
Site 1 was based on a PCT which was not involved in
the 2006 PCT reorganisations. There were over 50 GP
practices and over the previous few years several new
practices have been commissioned. The structure of the
PCT meant that commissioning/procurement and moni-
toring of primary care services were located within differ-
ent Directorates, with commissioning managed by the
Commissioning Directorate and monitoring managed by
the Primary Care Directorate. Roles within this structure
were changed during late 2009 (just prior to fieldwork
commencement) which resulted in different ways of
working and the development of different relationships
between the people involved at both the PCT and
APPCs. Following the publication of the newly elected
Coalition Government’s 2010 policy intentions[7], roles
again were changing due to the financial savings required
to be made by PCTs. This included the announcement of
redundancies and consequent role changes.
Site 2 was reorganised about two years prior to the
research into a cluster of four PCTs with four statutory
boards. It had a single chief executive, a single executive
management team, one clinical executive and one man-
agement executive. There was a procurement and con-
tract management Directorate, and performance
management sat within the primary care and commu-
nity team within this Directorate. After the 2010 elec-
tion [7], the PCT was re-organised again, with the
creation of a regional team for primary care commis-
sioning, covering both procurement and contract
management.
Our approach to data analysis was as follows. Primary
data (field notes, transcripts and documents) were
entered into Atlas.ti software, in order to both organise
the large amounts of data collected and provide a space
within which the team were able to work together on the
analysis. First level coding [10] provided an initial cate-
gorisation of responses and incidents according to a fra-
mework developed from our research questions (see
above). Later analysis included more inductive coding,
enabling us to address issues not anticipated in initial
research questions but which may nevertheless have
important policy implications. Emerging themes and the-
oretical ideas were discussed and refined throughout at
team meetings and through written memos, allowing pre-
cise definitions and use of codes to evolve. The sub-head-
ings used throughout the following section represent the
main themes drawn from the data collected across the
two sites.
Results and discussion
In what follows, verbatim quotes from interviews and
extracts from fieldnotes and collected documentation
are included where they illustrate the point being made
or represent a typical response. Respondents and sites
are anonymised, using broad job titles and ID numbers
to preserve confidentiality.
Procurement
The process of procurement was described as complex
and centrally directed. A senior PCT officer described
this:
My understanding is that they were something that’s
been pushed from the centre…. I do feel that the way
of...the principle of having the extended hours and
the additional services, and the demanding targets –
that all sits quite comfortably with me. The bit that I
struggle with, is about the complicated way in which
the contracts have been designed. (Site 1, Interview
PCT Officer, ID 1.2).
Procurement was consistently described as time-con-
suming, with very tight timetables. The work included
public consultation, preparation of invitations to tender,
receiving and scoring bids, moderation and dealing with
Table 1 Fieldwork [9]
Interviews Observations
Site 1 16 22
Site 2 7 5
Total 23 27
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legal issues. In addition, negotiation proved more difficult
than expected:
All APMS contracts to date proved difficult to negoti-
ate - not simple like Government said would be [i.e.
could be tweaked to fit local circumstances and have
needed lots of legal input each time]. There was lots
of interest for the 1st round (2008) fairness round
BUT much less for equitable access round - providers
had whole country to look at by then. (Site 1, notes
from meeting between researcher and PCT represen-
tatives, March 2010).
Processes could be contentious in terms of confidenti-
ality and transparency and as a result the process
became highly legalistic:
I think, for reasons that I don’t understand, there was
a lot of tightness around the process to do with confi-
dentiality and the fact that the...because these are
not typical contracts, and because the costings are
quite different than [for other forms of GP contract],
I think there’s a lot of tightness around the whole
process. (Site 1 PCT Officer, ID 1.2).
Levels of interest from APPCs varied, with less inter-
est shown by the bigger national companies (eg Virgin,
United Health) in the EAPMC round than in the earlier
FPCP round. This is probably explained by the fact that
procurement under FPCP only occurred in a small
number of PCTs, whereas every PCT was required to
procure at least one new practice under EAPMC.
Core provisions of the APMS contract were set cen-
trally and were very similar to other forms of primary
care contracts; however PCTs retained some ability to
address local needs. A small number of respondents
commented that the larger private companies were
easier to deal with as they were ‘more business-like’, but
it was also said that some larger providers often failed
to make their bid sufficiently locally focused. The pro-
cess of procurement was new to both the PCTs involved
and the potential providers themselves, and was
described as a steep learning curve.
Many respondents across the two sites stressed the
cost of procurement. Under FCPC there was central
funding for the procurement process, but no extra fund-
ing for the practices procured. Under EAPMC, by con-
trast, recurrent money was made available to fund
practices in the longer term, but no funding provided
for procurement. Some central procurement advice and
support was provided, but centrally imposed timescales
were so tight that by the time advice or support was
available, the relevant decisions had been made:
I think the other problem for us as commissioners
was getting advice from the Department of Health;
that was another big problem for us, because we
hadn’t done it before. So we were looking to the DH
for advice. So things for instance, the scoring metho-
dology [for assessing tenders], it was very, very com-
plex, far more complex than really it needed to be.
But we didn’t know any different. So getting some
clarification around some of the detail around that,
we didn’t always get it on time, or the tender work-
shops that DH ran, well, fine, we’d do them, but
they’d do them after our tender was submitted.(Site
2, interview PCT Officer, ID 2.1)
In addition, availability of suitable premises was an
issue, with several new practices initially occupying tem-
porary accommodation. This caused problems for those
affected, as they struggled to provide the full range of
services or advertise their location.
Types of APPC awarded contracts
The three main types of primary care provider organisa-
tion are GP-led companies, corporate providers and
social enterprises [11] [p9]. We found a diverse mix of
these types of APPC in both our Sites. Site 1 had several
different APPCs, each of which held between one and
five separate APMS contracts under either or both
FPCP and EAPMC. In Site 2 there were over five differ-
ent providers holding APMS contracts, most procured
under the EAPMC round. They included private compa-
nies (sometimes in partnership with local GPs), an
established out-of-hours service provider and a group
aiming for vertical integration with a Foundation Trust.
It was recognised early in the process in both sites
that the background and experience of individuals work-
ing within the APPCs had an impact on the operation of
the contract. This PCT officer explained it thus:
It’s evident that some practices are dealing with
things better than others but I think all of them
incur like problems, but I mean I suppose it’s like
anybody the more experience you have at some-
thing… And you have different people and your dif-
ferent partners, you’ve got [APPC1] they were
pharmacy, you know, pharmaceutical and then
they’ve got other business managers …so some areas
they will have better understanding. Then you’ve got
like with [named GP APPC3], s/he’s been in the GP
for some time and then I think a lot of it comes
down to business as well, so I think the role sort of
competency, they have all got a great knowledge and
some come across in different ways. (Site 1, interview
PCT Officer, ID 1.4).
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Another PCT officer explained perceived differences
between two of the providers in Site 1:
I do think, [APPC1] are much more commercial, and
actually that’s been very refreshing because… they
know what the target is, they know what the contract
is, and they’re working to that. So they’re very clear…
Whereas perhaps where we’ve got contractors who
have had a GMS or PMS contract before and have
no experience of APMS I think they have struggled to
acknowledge, recognise that it’s a very different con-
tract…(Site 1, interview PCT Officer, ID 1.7).
Provider behaviour
New providers were required to provide core primary
care services such as those currently provided by tradi-
tional general practices. In common with traditional
practices, APPCs can also be expected to provide: ‘direc-
ted enhanced services’ (services that PCTs must provide);
‘locally enhanced’ services (which are locally required and
agreed); and ‘national enhanced services’ (designed to
meet local needs but commissioned to national specifica-
tions and prices) [12]. However, APPCs were also subject
to additional specifications. These included the provision
of longer opening times than other local GPs: at least 5
additional hours per week or a minimum of 57.5 hours,
but often including stipulated opening hours of 8am –
8pm (Monday to Friday) and Saturday mornings [13].
Additionally, ‘GP-led Health Centres’ were expected to
open for a minimum of 84 hours per week (8am-8pm, 7
days a week, 365 days/year), and were also required to
provide facilities for ‘walk-in’ patients [14] that is,
patients not registered with the practice.
Attracting new patients to the APMS practices involved
leafleting, stalls in supermarkets and themed events. This
often attracted criticism from local GPs. A practice man-
ager set out some of their marketing strategies:
We put notices up in local shops, clinics, chemists,
there was articles in a newspaper… just before we
opened and we’ve also had, up to now, two leaflet
drops… within a three mile radius of the practice.
And we also have an open day this coming Saturday.
(Site 1, APPC1, Interview Practice Manager ID 1.17).
As time went on, however, patient recruitment was felt
to come more from personal recommendations than
from marketing events. The majority of the new practices
studied had struggled to meet their target list sizes, even
in areas previously identified as ‘under-doctored’, so that
some of the contracts were running at a loss overall. In
contrast, practices providing walk-in services tended to
be over-performing on this aspect of the contract.
We found few systematic differences between the ways
of working adopted by APPCs and what might be
expected in traditional general medical practice. Although
most APPCs relied mainly on salaried GPs, the working
roles and practices of clinicians within the practices did
not appear to differ systematically from traditional prac-
tices. For example, APPC staff took on roles such as medi-
cal lead or Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF
which is a voluntary reward and incentive programme for
all GP surgeries in England) lead, and APPC practices
used standard protocols just as many traditional practices
do. A number of APPCs in Site 2 had struggled to recruit
permanent medical staff, and were employing extensive
locum cover. In Site 1, by contrast, there was a financial
penalty associated with using locum doctors, as the PCT
regarded this as harmful to continuity of care. In general
however, the skill-mix profile of APPC practices did not
look obviously different to a traditional GMS practice,
except where the former had walk-in facilities.
Contract monitoring
In the English NHS, where quasi-markets (separation
between commissioners and providers) exist, contracts
have several functions: defining a level of activity required
for payment to be achieved; setting out a specific timescale
for these goals; detailing quality and standards; and setting
out penalties should these not be met [15]. This enables
monitoring to be undertaken and is generally agreed
between the commissioner and provider as part of the
procurement process. Historically, general practice con-
tracts have been fluid, flexible and largely vague [13]
(often referred to as the ‘John Wayne contract’: ‘a GP’s
gotta do what a GP’s gotta do’). However, the monitoring
of the APMS contracts was much tighter and more formal
than for other primary care contracts, as explained by a
PCT Officer:
it’s more formal, obviously, it’s…you can build up
relationships with GMS and PMS and advise on
what best practices and steer them in the right direc-
tion but with APMS you have the tools there to
ensure that they’re delivering in the areas that are
set out in the KPI [Key Performance Indicators]. (Site
2, interview PCT Officer, ID 2.4).
Monitoring included submission of statistics and elec-
tronic workbooks, sampling and checking (e.g. practice
appointment availability), and face-to-face meetings
between PCTs and contractors. All of these methods fed
into an assessment of performance against an extensive
range of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), and pay-
ment was linked to achievement. In Site 1 this process
was very formal with several meetings each month
between the PCT and each provider at which providers
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were expected to answer detailed questions. In Site 2,
whilst KPIs were similar, monitoring was less intensive,
and was more likely to involve one to one meetings
between a practice lead and a PCT manager.
Achievement of KPIs in both Sites was worth 25 per-
cent of the total contract value. KPIs were organised
into the following areas: access; quality; service delivery;
value for money; and patient experience. These domains
were centrally set with detailed examples provided by
the Department of Health in a contract template.
Within this, however, the PCTs could specify the
required KPIs (for our sites each domain contained up
to 21 specific indicators) and weight them according to
local priorities.
During the research in both sites we saw the negotia-
tion of formal contract amendments, as it became clear
that some KPIs were unclear or unworkable. The form-
ality of this process and the associated managerial time
required is in contrast to the informal flexibility asso-
ciated with a traditional GMS contract. Examples
included discussion in Site 2 of whether or not it was
legitimate for a patient who arrived at a walk-in centre
10 minutes before closing time to be turned away. In
Site 1 the ongoing need for renegotiation was further
complicated by the fact that a different team was
involved in monitoring the contract from that which
undertook the procurement. This meant that the staff
responsible for monitoring the contract did not know
what the thinking behind the contract provisions had
been, and did not understand some of the KPIs. In Site
2 these teams overlapped, ensuring that those monitor-
ing the contract were aware of the intentions behind
individual clauses.
There was some evidence that the experience of moni-
toring APMS contracts in this way led PCT staff to
think about traditional practices in a different way and
in some cases consider introducing new targets into
existing contracts:
The targets and KPIs in the APMS contracts are very
specific to the APMS contracts. We are trying to
introduce, as part of our health and equality, some
stretch targets for our GMS and PMS contracts, but
that’s something that’s just currently in process that
we’re trying to get worked out and agreement with
the LMC... (Site 1, interview PCT Officer, ID 1.2).
Nevertheless, it was recognised that the monitoring
process used was very intensive and time consuming.
Externalities
PCT respondents in Site 2 felt that the procurements
had ‘stirred up’ local GPs and made them think a bit
more about their own services, making them ‘raise their
game’ in relation to other local practices. For example,
the PCT described the procurements as ‘giving them
leverage’ over GPs, and it has also created a market in
alternative providers. This was obvious when they went
out to tender for the local contract for Out of Hours
Services: after the EAPMC process there were a number
of new providers in the market. In addition, we were
told that the process had prompted some GPs locally to
extend their opening hours [9].
One of the managers from APPC1 in Site 1 explained
their belief that tension could be healthy:
Take PBC [Practice-based Commissioning] – in some
areas PBC groups tried to stop APPC1 coming in. It
is stacked against us from [the] start e.g. PEC Chairs
(who are GPs and have friends locally) chairing com-
missioning panels. However I would say you need a
healthy tension in an area – this can push some
practices under but those that can take the lead and
make things better. (Site 1, APPC1, Interview APPC
Manager, ID 1.14).
There had been some difficulties in the relationships
(at least initially) between APPCs and other local GP
practices, especially where they were based in the same
building. In Site 1 there were allegations by APPCs that
other practices had removed signage and misdirected
patients. In Site 2 there were suggestions that staff at a
minor injuries service which shared premises with an
APPC practice had deliberately misdirected patients
away from the APPC. These difficulties seem to stem
from competition over patients:
Obviously GPs were established prior to this scheme.
There were a number of anxieties, as there were
nationally, especially around the health centres,
would they take lots of activity away from their prac-
tice, the fact that they were open longer hours and at
weekends. (Site 2, interview PCT Officer, ID 2.3).
APPC practices were contractually required to partici-
pate in PBC; however some did not. This was some-
times out of choice but often due to reluctance of
existing PBC groups to accommodate the new practices
into their structure.
We’re not part of PBC. That’s quite interesting actu-
ally because contractually we have to be part of PBC
and so we started with the intent of, you know, being
part of the PBC because from a contractual point of
view, you know, we’re required to do that. The PBC
group then, supported by the PCT, said no you’re not
going to, we don’t want you here so don’t come
please. And then the PCT said well if that’s what
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they want then that’s fine with us.(Site 2, APPC 4,
Interview Executive Director, ID 2.6)
Additionally, for those APPC practices which were
engaged with PBC, the absence of full time GPs could
make this difficult and sporadic.
Perceived difficulties and successes
All interviewees were asked about their perceptions of
the process as a whole. Problems reported included dif-
ficulties in attaining predicted list sizes and employing
full-time GPs; turnover of GPs; co-location of practices
with established practices; and definitions or interpreta-
tions of KPIs within the contract. Other commonly
identified issues included the affordability of the APPC
contracts with small lists, as many of the indicators
were based on a projection of increased list size over
the life of the contract. The following was observed at
an end of year reconciliation meeting:
There followed a brief discussion between APPC1 and
PCT1 about the fact that all APMS practices had
been given the same list growth projections at the
outset and the APMS practices had not been able to
change this. It did not make sense as in addition to
this they were provided with practice demographics
and these were highly variable so both agreed at out-
set they should have been able to change the projec-
tions (set by centre). (Site 1, notes observation,
APPC1 reconciliation meeting September 2010).
There was also some concern that the existence of
‘walk-in’ centres was stimulating new demand for ser-
vices which could significantly add to overall costs (over
performance against contracts). Additionally, both PCT
and APPC staff again highlighted the issue of time taken
in monitoring the contract.
All respondents were asked what their definition of ‘suc-
cess’ for an APMS contract would be. The answers varied
but often included measures such as meeting KPIs and
QOF targets; achieving patient satisfaction rates; increas-
ing list size and financial stability, renewal of contracts
after the initial 5 years; staff stability, high morale and a
well functioning practice; provision of services under
adverse circumstances (e.g. poor premises); provision of
additional services and good working relationships.
Most commonly, an answer included meeting KPIs
and QOF targets plus some sort of broader measure
such as references to providing better patient care or
improving health as illustrated by the following answers:
My definition of its success is improving the health of
the local community, our registered patients, yes, but
the local community as a whole. So I think that’s a
difficult one because that’s just an aspiration we
have as an organisation and not specifically related
to this sort of APMS contract. (Site 1, APPC3, inter-
view Business Manager ID1.25).
Well obviously taking into consideration the KPIs
and it’s a big thing for us, and QOF, it’s the idea
behind them is...the reason that they’re there is to
provide better patient care and to check that we are
doing that. I suppose it’s like examination results for
schools. It’s just a way of checking we’re doing what
we should be doing, and that’s the overall thing that
just because something’s a KPI we don’t focus on it,
we focus on the full patient care as well. (Site 1,
APPC1, interview Practice Manager, ID 1.16).
Patient satisfaction rates were measured within the
APMS contracts and as part of QOF and were worth a
substantial amount of money. They were thus perceived
to be important by both PCT and APPC respondents:
Well, from a wide perspective, a successful contractor is
one that achieves its KPI’s and hits its list size targets,
because then it’s doing what was expected of it from the
outset. From a personal point of view, I would say …the
KPI’s were set for a reason, they were the KPI’s that the
PCT wanted the practice to achieve in. So if they are
hitting those KPI’s then that would be a successful prac-
tice in my eyes. Obviously, to ensure that there’s no com-
plaints from patients, we have a PALS service and the
providers are also required to let us know of any com-
plaints that they have received. So, obviously, patient
satisfaction would be a good factor in deciding if it’s
successful or not. (Site 2, interview PCT Officer, ID 2.4).
Only a few PCT staff and APPC business managers
suggested that the new arrangements should be judged
in terms of the provision of greater access and choice
that had been the official rationale for the whole cen-
trally-directed procurement programme.
We asked all of our respondents if they thought that
the APMS contracts provided value for money. Many
were unsure, as they suggested it was taking time for
the contracts to bed in. This PCT officer put it thus:
It depends, it depends why they’re there. If they’re to
stir up the GP community to, then yeah, they’re a
good thing. If, if, as a strict economic model, probably
not. (Site 1, interview PCT Officer, ID 1.6)
Others thought they were definitely not value for
money:
I absolutely don’t think its value for money, when you
think about what a GP gets, it’s sixty five quid a year
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per patient, and a walk in centre gets more than that
per walk in...Every time someone walks through the
door, no, I don’t think it’s value for money, absolutely
not.... It’s very costly, it’s not value for money, it just
isn’t value for money. (Site 2, interview PCT Officer,
ID 2.2).
This senior PCT Officer added that GP-led health
centres are massively over-performing on their walk in
contracts and were thus ‘not sustainable’.
Discussion
The commissioning of primary care did not form a pro-
minent part of the 2010 Health White Paper, Equity
and Excellence[7], other than to state that it would be
become the responsibility of the new NHS Commission-
ing Board (NHSCB). There was no specific reference to
the different types of primary care contract, but subse-
quent guidance has suggested that from April 2013 the
responsibility for GP-led health centres established
under EAPMC and other APMS contracts will be taken
on by the NHSCB [17]. This guidance suggests that
Local Area Teams of the NHSCB will take over respon-
sibility for monitoring APMS contracts, although it
seems unlikely that they will be able to maintain the
level of detailed performance management that we
observed in our study, as they will have significantly
fewer staff than PCTs locally.
Emerging Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs –
the organisations which will replace Primary Care Trusts
in commissioning the majority of health services locally
from April 2013 and formally known as GP consortia)
should not inherit any contractual liabilities for the ser-
vices provided under current EAPMC or APMS con-
tracts [18], although they may take on responsibility for
administering some aspects of both GMS and APMS
contracts (for example, QOF and improving the quality
of primary medical care) [17]. It nevertheless seems
clear that future policy will be based on the assumption
that competition between providers is essential in any
drive to improve quality [7] [p37].
It is therefore implied that service provision by APPCs
will continue, although it is unclear whether the full
range of currently available primary care contracts
(APMS, PMS, GMS) will continue to be available over
time, or if there will be a convergence between the
types, and whether the five-year duration of contacts
with retendering (common under APMS) could be
extended to other types. Whilst our study is a small
one, our evidence is detailed and robust. There is there-
fore the potential to learn from our research about the
future procurement, operation and monitoring of such
providers working under the APMS regime, and for
future procurement by the NHS Commissioning Board.
Other research [19] has drawn a distinction between
relational and (classical) transactional contracting. In the
former, existing relationships and history of working can
shape the way in which commissioning / contracting is
undertaken with less formal processes, flexible timeta-
bles and little use of formal penalties. Transactional
commissioning / contracting is much less fluid, sticking
more rigidly to specified timescales and targets (e.g.
KPIs) and having the ability to penalise poor perfor-
mance and ultimately terminate contracts.
It was clear from this research that the contracts (and
processes) we observed were of a transactional nature.
This is, perhaps, inevitable, given that fact that these con-
tracts were with new (and often untried) providers, with
whom PCTs did not have any prior relationships. How-
ever, this study shows that, whilst transactional contract-
ing may be safe, in that it ensures that providers do
provide the services they are contracted to provide, it is
also hugely time consuming and expensive, and perhaps
therefore unsustainable in the new NHS [20].
Furthermore, it is also probably less effective overall, as
demonstrated by the detailed discussions that we
observed over how to interpret the detailed KPIs. Thus,
for example, the discussion observed between APPC and
PCT managers around whether or not a patient who pre-
sented 10 minutes before official ‘closing time’ could
legitimately be turned away; under the more flexible and
less clearly specified GMS contract it is unlikely that this
would be seen as an option. The only significant advan-
tage that these contracts would seem to have is that they
are easier to terminate if they are not felt to be operating
effectively.
It appears that concerns such as those we have identified
from our studies may already have caused closure or tem-
porary suspension of some GP-led health centres (com-
missioned under EAPMC). For example, one closure [21]
in Stockport in September 2010 and in November 2011
the closure of a walk-in centre in central Leeds as part of
moves to save money [22]. From 1 December 2011 it was
reported that the Hillside Bridge walk-in centre, Bradford
(the first Darzi centre to be opened in December 2008),
would be open from 2pm to 8pm, seven days a week – a
reduction in its original opening hours which was 8am to
8pm. Any patients registered there can still access appoint-
ments from 8am; the changes only affect non-registered
patients using the walk-in service [23]. These amendments
/ closures are made possible by the transactional nature of
the contracts involved, and this could be seen as an advan-
tage of this approach. However, such changes are experi-
enced as disruptive by patients [24], and it seems unlikely
that a model of primary care provision predicated upon
the relatively rapid entry and exit of new providers into a
market would be seen generally as desirable in the context
of an NHS in which building a relationship with a known
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and trusted GP is regarded as important by both doctors
and patients [25].
We could not formally assess outcomes over the short
duration of this project, but respondents did discuss their
own perceptions of success. Some told us that thinking
about contracts in this way had encouraged them to be a
little more challenging with existing GPs, and it may be
that in the longer term this will be one of the more last-
ing outcomes from the process. Additionally, some
claimed that the existence of local competition had led
some traditional general practices to ‘raise their game’.
Whilst many new providers were proud of what they had
achieved, and demonstrated commitment to patient care
and satisfaction, the APMS contracts whose operation we
observed were generally perceived as a relatively expen-
sive way of providing primary care, particularly in view of
the difficulties many APPCs found in building up ade-
quate list sizes. This latter suggests that the demand for
new GP practices was less than policy makers anticipated,
whilst the high levels of ‘walk in’ access were regarded by
our PCT respondents as representing an unsustainable
lowering of the threshold for seeking help and a conse-
quent increase in costs, rather than an uncovering of
important levels of unmet need.
It remains to be seen in the longer term whether
APMS contracts such as these become a blueprint for
the wider renegotiation of the current GMS contract, or
whether they continue at the margins, ‘stirring up’ exist-
ing practices to raise their game but without wider
impact. Our research suggests the need for a debate
about the operation of a market in primary care provi-
sion in the longer term, set against the background of
current organisational changes (development of CCGs,
NHSCB) including the trade-offs between transparent
processes, fair procurement, performance assurance and
costs.
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